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Abstract 
A brief history of the Australian venture capital (VC) industry to April 2001 
precedes critique of the current industry framework.  This focuses on two questions: 
What has history taught us? and How well does the Australian VC industry enable 
entrepreneurship in the Australian economy?  The answers embrace suggestions for 
better encouragement of entrepreneurship through research-based VC industry 
enhancement.  A positive prognosis is based on a case history.  A knowledgeable private 
citizen significantly influenced the passage of legislation vital to the industry.  This 
success indicates the practical importance that a future program of structured research 
might have for the development of venture capital and entrepreneurship in Australia. 
Objectives, rationale and design of the paper 
All branches of research share a common need for periodic stocktaking.  From time 
to time it is useful to pause in the quest for more knowledge in the vein of why is it so?  
The pause gives time to evaluate existing knowledge using the twin questions: What do 
have we learned so far? and What does this knowledge portend? In any field, a truly 
detailed treatment of both questions might produce a significant work of social and 
intellectual history.  A humbler treatment might better be described as a brief ‘survey and 
critique’ of the field.  This paper attempts the latter task.  It is a summary attempt to take 
critical stock of the past performance, present structure and future portents of the 
Australian venture capital industry as they stand in April 2001.  
This date marks the first anniversary of the ‘tech wreck’: the dramatic fall in the 
value of many technology stocks on world stock markets.  In the fullness of history it is 
likely that the bursting of the ‘dotcom bubble’ will be seen as a watershed event in the 
evolution of international venture capital.  In Australia, the time seems right to reflect 
upon the past, present and future of the industry.  History shows that, after a minor boom 
period, venture capital virtually disappeared within three years of the traumatic stock 
market collapse of 1987.  In a study to be reviewed below, Cornelius and Hargreaves 
concluded that by 1991 ‘… the industry is close to extinction’ (Cornelius and Hargreaves 
1991: 2).  The present downturn in the attractiveness of new venture investments in the 
wake of the ‘tech wreck’ now makes it timely to investigate whether the Australian 
venture capital industry is likely to repeat history or transcend it.  
This study was conducted from two points of view: that of the scholar of 
entrepreneurship and that of an experienced, practising Australian venture capitalist.  
Both points of view blend efficiently because the authors believe that venture capital’s 
contribution to a national economy and society is best measured with respect to the extent 
that it contributes to the enabling of entrepreneurship.  Given this dominant perspective 
and despite obvious limits of scope and detail, the authors believe that the paper will have 
utility for several audiences including: entrepreneurship researchers, industry 
practitioners, social analysts and policy makers.  
The paper begins with a definition of venture capital and a summary of its generic 
industrial structure.  A brief historical narrative of the Australian venture capital industry 
follows.  It includes diagrams that summarise the supply and demand situation of the 
industry at three key points in its evolution.  The paper then provides a portrait of the 
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current Australian VC industry framework (as at April 2001) through description of key 
stakeholders.  The combination of historical narrative and current description provides a 
platform for critique.  This is focused on two key questions: What has history taught us? 
and How well does the Australian venture capital industry enable entrepreneurship in the 
Australian economy? The paper then presents suggestions for better encouragement of 
entrepreneurship through improvements in the venture capital industry.  It concludes with 
a positive prognosis for the industry based on a brief case history of constructive policy 
making.  A private citizen, well-motivated and well-informed, was able to influence the 
passage of crucial capital gains tax legislation.  This success indicates the practical 
importance that a future program of structured research might have for the productive 
development of venture capital and entrepreneurship in Australia. 
Institutional venture capital: definition and generic industrial structure 
Venture capital is commonly viewed as high-risk equity capital involved in the 
formation and launch of new companies with innovative technologies.  Seed and start-up 
capital is sometimes considered synonymous with venture capital when in reality it is 
only a small segment.  Institutional venture capital may more truly be regarded as an 
investment made by a financial intermediary in a private company with the long-term aim 
of taking the company public and realising a significant capital gain.  This definition 
eliminates individual investors who may invest in a private company with a similar 
objective.  These individuals are properly defined as angel investors. 
Venture capitalists (VCs) are thus financial intermediaries.  They stand between 
entrepreneurs in private companies seeking equity to grow their businesses and the 
stockbrokers and merchant bankers seeking companies to list on the public markets.  In 
the USA, for example, VCs now generate over half of all NASDAQ initial public 
offerings (IPOs).  The funds mediated by VCs may come from retail, corporate or 
institutional investors or a combination of all three.  Typically, venture capital funds are 
of two types: either investing in growth companies or in some form of leveraged buy-out.  
During the 1980s while the growth segment expanded, the leveraged buy-out market 
(LBO) exploded, particularly in the USA and UK.  However, in the 1990s, growth 
segment has expanded considerably in the USA and the leveraged buy-out market has 
declined mainly due to lack of opportunities.  In the UK, LBO funds used to represent 
80% of the market.  Funds are sourced from three main areas: financial institutions; 
corporations and retail investors. 
Given the portfolio approach and the deal structure VC’s use (see Zider 1998 for a 
masterly exposition of the mechanics of venture capital investing) only 10% to 20% of 
the companies funded need to be real winners to achieve the targeted return rate of 25% 
to 30%.  In fact, VC reputations are often built on one or two good investments.  The VC 
manager generally regarded as the best in the world is Kleiner–Perkins.  The first fund 
invested $7.5 million in 17 companies and returned $345 million.  Two investments, 
Tandem and Genetech, generated $325 million. 
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Chart 1 shows the actual internal rate of 
return (IRR) performance of selected clusters of US Venture Capital managers form 1980 
to 1988.   
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Chart 1.
Comparative portfolio performance of VC managers 
(Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000)
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In the 10 years 1980–89 the USA venture capital asset class returned 7.1% on 
average.  The average of the top performer was 31.8%.  The average return of the top two 
quartiles was 15.2%, which is a good return.  However, if you know the average and the 
top two quartile figure you can calculate the bottom two quartile figure.  They average 
out over 10 years to a negative 1.1%.  In other words, if you are choosing a VC manager, 
particularly a new one, there is 50/50 chance the manager will give you a negative return.  
In fact the situation is worse.  The reality is as follows: 
 The bottom 25% of the managers will lose most if not all your money. 
 The next 25% will give you a return around the cash rate. 
 The next 25% will give you the return on an indexed equity fund with much more 
administration. 
 The top quartile will give outstanding returns in the order of 25% – 30%, post fees, 
fund after fund. 
 
 5 
When this is compared to the listed equity market where the standard deviation 
around the mean return is 1.5% it is easier to understand the challenge facing investors 
when selecting a new VC manager. 
So, venture capital is a defined but difficult industry.  How has it fared in 
Australia? 
History of the Australian venture capital industry to April 2001 
1970: The Lone Ranger comes home from Harvard 
Bill Ferris is a principal of Australian Mezzanine Investments Pty Ltd and the 
founder and former president of the Australian Venture Capital Association.  He has 
legitimate claim to being Australia’s first formal venture capitalist.  In 1970, with a 
freshly-printed Harvard Master of Business Administration (MBA) to hang on the wall, 
the 25-year-old Ferris returned to Australia.  He had decided to start his own venture 
capital company (Ferris 2000: 6).  He called it grandly, International Venture 
Corporation Pty Ltd (IVC).  It was capitalised at less than $500,000 (Ferris 2000: 94). 
Prior to 1970, there was a noticeable gap in equity risk capital in Australia’s 
financial market place.  Angels existed and the public markets, especially in times of 
economic boom, provided scope for high-risk venturing via public subscription to untried 
companies – particularly in mineral and oil exploration.  But there was nothing in the 
middle.  One of the first government initiatives to encourage venture capital was sector-
specific and tax-driven.  Known as the 10BA tax deduction scheme it was aimed at 
accelerating the revival of the Australian film industry.  Between 1968 and 1978 some of 
Australia’s best-known films were financed through the scheme.  
By the late 1970s, the Lone Ranger had been joined by a few other pioneering 
companies: not nearly enough to warrant the collective label ‘industry’.  In this period of 
VC pre-history, the most important venture capital company, was actually government-
owned.  The Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC) was spawned when 
enthusiasm waned for sector-specific initiatives (such as the film industry tax scheme).  
AIDC’s main focus was upon the financing of major projects in manufacturing and 
mining: projects believed to have a national interest component.  However, AIDC’s 
activities included some important private equity investments many of which did well 
(particularly in the wine and mineral processing sectors) and provided good press for both 
venture capital and direct government involvement in the asset class.  AIDC’s portfolio of 
smaller high-technology ventures did far less well.  AIDC had quit private capital 
investing by the late 1980s.  However, its early successes and possibly even more 
importantly its early failures in high-tech, had an important bearing on the emergence of 
the Management Investment Corporations (MIC) program.  As will be seen, MIC was the 
initiative generally accepted to mark the start of the formal venture capital industry in 
Australia.   
1983: the watershed year 
The year 1983 featured a trinity of events that were to be seminal in the 
development of the Australian venture capital industry.  
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First, Barry Jones achieved the zenith of his media and political influence in 
Australia.  Jones was (and remains) a prominent national figure, initially as a quiz show 
star and subsequently as a prominent Labor politician and social commentator.  He had 
(and retains) one of the highest media profiles in the nation.  In 1983 a new edition of his 
book, Sleepers Wake, was the catalyst for an unprecedented depth and breadth of national 
discussion about Australia’s need to develop a more entrepreneurial culture (Jones 1983).   
Second, in April, a government-commissioned committee, headed by Sir Frank 
Espie, published a report for the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences (Espie et 
al 1983).  It presented the incumbent Minister for Science and Technology (a member of 
the governing and sceptical Liberal Party) with recommendations and guidelines for a 
government initiative to kick start an Australian venture capital industry.  
Third, the Labor Party, committed to a program of state-sponsored, structural 
economic changes, won the Federal Election.  Barry Jones became the new Minister of 
Science.  John Button became Minister for Industry.  They wasted no time in convincing 
their colleagues to implement the recommendations of the Espie report.  Based very 
substantially on these recommendations, an act of the Federal Parliament introduced the 
Management and Investment Companies (MIC) program.  The major benefit of the 
program was a 100% tax deduction on capital subscribed.  A critique of the program will 
be provided below, in the evaluation section of the paper.  For the time being, the authors 
will confine themselves to a narrative of the program and allied developments. 
1984 – October 1987: four years of feast 
The venture capital industry in Australia is generally agreed by participants to have 
started in April 1984 with the handing out of seven MIC licences by the Federal 
Government.  By 1986/87 the industry probably had some $500 million under 
management.  The supply and demand curve analysis probably would have looked 
something like figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  VC industry 1986/7
IRR%
$ invested
M ainly retail investors,
few institutions
Entrepreneurs reign
M ICs invest  in
$54m in 47 deals
S1
S2
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The demand schedule is simply the quantity of venture-capital-seeking 
entrepreneurial firms capable of supplying a particular rate of return.  As the price (here 
the expected rate of return) increases, the supply of companies that can meet the rising 
return decreases.  Hence the demand schedule will slope downwards.  The supply 
schedule is determined by the willingness of investors to provide funds to venture capital 
managers.  This, in turn, depends on the expected return on venture capital investments.  
The supply schedule thus slopes upwards. 
Prior to 1984, the supply curve would have been like S1 high in the left-hand 
corner and sloping sharply upwards.  The major benefit of the MIC program to investors 
was that investors received a 100% tax deduction on capital subscribed.  For taxpayers on 
the highest marginal rate in the mid – 1980s (namely 60%) venture capital became an 
attractive investment.  For institutions such as superfunds on a 0% taxation rate, the tax 
deduction was of no use whatsoever.  Hence the supply curve sloped gently upwards for a 
part of the curve as retail investors in MICs entered the market but then kicked sharply 
upwards as few, if any, institutions entered the market.  
By 1986/87 the media was full of stories of stock-market buccaneers (mislabeled 
‘entrepreneurs’ by the financial press) such as Christopher Skase and Alan Bond.  When 
combined with economic growth, this led to an upsurge in demand for all categories of 
higher risk investments.  In 1986/87 the MICs (by that time probably representing around 
half the Australian venture capital industry) invested $54 million in 47 companies. 
November 1987 –  late 1993: seven years of famine 
‘The lifeblood of the venture capital process consists of three essential 
components: entrepreneurial deals, money to invest in those deals and a return in the 
money invested in them’.  (Bygrave and Timmons 1992: 261).   
Numerous studies in the USA have illustrated the truth of this assertion by 
demonstrating that the three major determinants of entrepreneurial activity in the 
economy are: the rate of capital gains tax; gross domestic product (GDP) growth; and the 
cost of capital.  In Australia, by 1991, all three factors were extremely negative.   
In 1985, the Labor government had introduced capital gains taxation for the first 
time in Australia’s history.  The effects of late 1980s inflation now acted on this to 
provide Australia with the highest rate of real capital gains tax in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  The economy was in recession and 
the long-term bond rate was around 15%.  Entrepreneurial demand virtually disappeared 
from the economy (Cornelius and Hargreaves 1991: 2 and passim). 
On the supply side, the confidence of retail investors was obliterated by the 
combination of the 1987 stock market crash with the 1989 property crash.  Institutional 
investors were beginning a great shift to overseas listed equity investment.  Thus 
Australia suffered both steeply sloping demand and supply schedules as depicted in 
figure 2.  In 1991/2 the MICs did two deals worth $11 million.  In June 1991 the MIC 
program had been terminated under pressure from The Commonwealth Treasury on the 
grounds that Australia had no need of a VC industry.  The established MICs kept 
operating their existing portfolios but did little new business. 
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Figure 2.  VC industry 1991/2
IRR%
$ invested
Long term bond rate at 15%
Highest real CGT rate in OECD 47.5%,
MICs invest $11 m in 2 deals
New funds = 0invest $11m in 2 deals
 
The recovery 1994 – 2000 
The decline in the long-term bond rate to 5% – 6% combined with excellent GDP 
growth saw entrepreneurial demand gradually reappear in the Australian economy.  In 
1999, the halving of the capital gains tax rate caused another shift.  In the 12 months to 
September 2000, one VC company, Nanyang Ventures, saw its deal flow effectively 
double.  Many firms experienced similar expansion in activity.  Larger Australian 
financial institutions now started to allocate a small percentage of their portfolio to 
venture capital.  This was in part a result of the very impressive gains made in the USA 
and UK where venture capital had been providing exceptional returns (30% plus) during 
the 1990s.  Also the Australian VC community began providing some big investment 
wins such as Neverfail Springwater, and Datacraft.   
 Accordingly, both the demand and supply schedules shifted to the right and 
flattened as in figure 3.  
 In 2000, 42 new funds were formed nearly doubling the number of funds formed in 
1999. Venture capital firms broke the Australian $1 billion mark in fundraising for the 
first time, with fund managers belonging to the Australian Venture Capital Association 
(AVCAL) raising over $A1.2 billion in 2000 (AVCAL 2000: ix). In 2000, 11 companies 
went public, 12 were acquired and four investments were liquidated. Australian funds 
formed between 1986 and 1999 achieved an 18.3% IRR as of 30 December 1999. The top 
performing funds had returns between 19.7% and 71.5% (AVCAL 2000: ix). In addition, 
it was estimated that, at minimum, a further $4.7 billion was available for investment in 
venture capital (Bivell 2001:19). 
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Figure 3.  VC industry 1999
IRR%
$ invested
More entrepreneurs
lower CGT rates &
growing economy
More institutions
Tax incentives
IIF program
$403m in124 new
investments 16 new funds
 
 
 
Industry performance summary as at June 2000 
 The Australian Bureau of Statistics, (ABS 2001: passim) in its first ever survey of 
the asset class, provided the following figures on the state of the Australian venture 
capital industry at the close of the 1999/2000 financial year. 
 
 Investors had committed $4.9 billion to venture capital investment vehicles 
including $2.3 billion in commitments for future investment.  
 The value of investments in venture capital investment vehicles was $2.6 billion at 
30 June 2000.  
 The survey identified 97 active venture capital managers, who managed 123 
investment vehicles.  
 The 123 investment vehicles had 569 investments in investee companies.  
 There was $666 million invested in new projects during the 1999–2000 financial 
year with additional investments in existing projects of $163 million, giving a total 
of $829 million invested in venture capital projects in the year.  
 The value of exits from existing investments during the year was $536 million.   
 There was venture capital investment in a wide range of industries and activities; 
including investment in manufacturing projects of $568 million; property and 
business services projects of $440 million in a total project value of $2.3 billion.  
 Australian superannuation funds were the largest investors in venture capital 
vehicles.  35% of the $4.9 billion committed at the end of the financial year came 
from Australian superannuation funds. 
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Current industry framework: major stakeholders and programs 
VC funds targeting institutional investors 
Institutions (with or with out the advice of asset consultants) either invest directly 
into an independent fund or through a fund of funds.  In Australia the major industry 
superannuation funds have put together the Development Australia Fund which in turn 
allocates money to VC managers.   
The independent fund structure employs a structure designed to emulate the best 
features of the limited partnership model that predominates in the USA.  It is typically a 
10-year, unlisted terminating fund.  The venture capital manager is generally allowed five 
years to make investments and then in the second five years the manager is expect to 
divest the portfolio.  A typical portfolio will have some 15 investments.  Funding is 
drawn down as when it is required and when the divestment occurs both the principal and 
harvest are returned to the investors.  This is done to maximise the IRR, which is the key 
metric in venture capital. 
The manager earns fees in two ways.  First there is a management fee usually paid 
quarterly and paid as a percentage of committed capital in the range of 1.5% – 2.5% per 
annum for the first five years.  In the second five years a typical structure is to have 
declining fees based on invested capital.  The fees are paid via quarterly calls.  Second 
there is the performance incentive.  This is typically 20% of the excess return defined as 
the principal invested plus fees indexed by some factor such as the 10-year 
commonwealth bond rate.  The managers only get the performance incentive after the 
investors have received all their indexed capital back and the first part of the performance 
incentive is generally only paid in years seven and eight. 
To see how this operates consider St. George Development Capital, the first fund 
managed by Nanyang Ventures, which started in April 1996 with a $20 million 
investment by St. George Bank.  Over the life of the fund $3.5 million will be paid in 
management fees leaving $16.5 million for investment.  The fund invested $15.9 million 
in 11 companies by October 1999.  The current valuation of the portfolio is $42 million 
and management expects the fund achieve a value of around $70 million.  The application 
of the indexation factor (the All-Industrials Accumulation Index) to the fees and principal 
totals $33 million leaving $37 million as the excess harvest.  20% of this or around $7.4 
million will go to the fund manager, Nanyang.  Thus over the life of the fund the 
management fee of $3.5 million represents around one-third of the total expected 
compensation. 
Corporate VC funds 
Corporate VC funds have had a checkered history.  In Australia there have been 
several attempts such as Apple and the Telstra Product Development Fund.  Typically, a 
corporate fund is announced with considerable media hyperbole.  Several investments are 
made and then after about four years the fund is quietly terminated.  There are a number 
of problems.  A key question is whether the manager should be independent or a captive 
internal group.  Captive managers in venture capital do not generally work.  Corporations 
find it difficult to pay compensation schemes comparable to those of independent VC 
managers.  This leads to frequent staff turnover.  There is also a lack of autonomy as 
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capital requests typically have to go to a meeting of the full board of the company for 
approval.  Another problem is that few Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), last 10 years, 
the normal life of a VC fund.  The ‘brilliant strategic opportunity’ becomes the previous 
CEO’s pet project.  Corporations can change their strategic focus several times in a 10-
year period.  Finally, there is always a legitimate question as to whether corporations 
should be using capital in this way.  The traditional argument for the ‘no’ case is that, if 
corporations have excess capital, they should return it to their shareholders.  The usual 
argument in favour of corporate venturing is that it is a form of strategic insurance. 
Retail VC funds 
Another class of VC funds are entities listed on the stock market.  Retail investors 
generally prefer listed vehicles.  They find unlisted funds with no returns for at least five 
years and no liquidity to be unattractive investments.   
PDF (Pooled Development Fund) program 
The PDF program is arguably the most important ingredient in Australia’s current 
VC industry mix.  Government sponsored, the PDFs were first announced in the February 
1992 Economic Statement (subsequently modified in 1994).  The aim was to replace the 
MIC program (which expired in June 1991) and encourage investment in new and 
growing companies by offering taxation advantages.  The principal benefits areas were 
originally as follows.  For the company: 15% tax on dividends; 15% tax on capital gains; 
25% tax on interest income (all compared with the normal company tax rate of 36%).  
For the shareholders (investors): tax exemption for unfranked dividends; tax exemption 
or imputation credits for franked dividends; tax exemption for capital gains on disposal of 
shares in the company.  In return for these benefits, there are some limitations. 
Investment is not allowed in retail or property sectors.  Investee companies must not have 
assets in excess of $50 million at time of initial investment.  At least 65% of any capital 
raised must be invested within five years of that raising.  No more than 30% of capital 
raised can be invested in one company.  Capital invested originally could not be returned 
to investors until the company was wound up.  A subsequent change, allowing buyback 
by a company of its shares, enables investors to obtain a full recoupment at any stage of 
fund evolution. Debt funding and pseudo-equity are not permitted.  Investment must be in 
new equity, not pre-owned. 
At first, the PDFs were used as mechanism for investing in small listed equities, 
mainly in the resources area.  However, several venture capital fund managers (including 
Greenchip and Hambro Grantham) have chosen the PDF structure.  In April 1996, St. 
George Bank, making use of the ability of a bank to own 100% of a PDF, set up St. 
George Development Capital Limited and appointed Nanyang Ventures as its manager.  
This was the first 100% bank-owned PDF in Australia. 
In 1999, after a survey of industry participants, the Government announced several 
key amendments.  First it allowed PDFs to buy back their shares.  PDFs could now 
emulate the best practise institutional fund structure.  In addition, superfunds who invest 
in PDFs will, effectively, enjoy a rebate of the 15% tax paid by PDFs they support.  In 
November 1999, St. George Development Capital II closed with $64 million raised from 
seven financial institutions.  This was the first institutional-only PDF in Australia.  There 
are currently 90 registered PDFs that have raised an estimated $420 million.  Over $215 
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million has been invested in about 200 small-medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  The 
government endeavours to keep the program relevant to the marketplace by instituting 
adaptive changes when it deems them necessary. 
IIF (Innovation Investment Fund) program 
Another government initiative, the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) program for 
providing early stage capital was announced in the May 1997 Federal Budget.  The 
genesis of the program was an analysis conducted by Professor Gordon Murray, a 
respected European academic analyst of early-stage funds.  The IIF program aims to 
create a self-sustaining, Australian, early stage, technology-based venture capital market 
and to improve the commercialisation outcomes of Australia’s strong Research and 
Development (R&D) capabilities.  The first stage of the IIF was to provide $130 million 
on a 2:1 basis with private-sector capital, thereby creating potential funding of $195 
million.  Five IIF licences were handed out in December 1997.  Since then another eight 
have been issued. IIF funds are restricted to investing in companies that are 
commercialising innovative technology, with an annual revenue of $4 million or less, 
averaged over the past two years, and a maximum of $5 million in any one year.  
Investments will be in the form of equity.  Distribution of returns will be made in the 
following order.  
 
1. Government and private capital (pro-rata) indexed to the Long Term Bond Rate. 
2. Of the funds remaining, 10% will go to Government and 90% to the private 
investors; and 20% of the private distribution will be retained by the fund manager 
provided they achieve a hurdle rate of return greater than the Long Term Bond 
Rate. 
3. Effectively, an IIF investor gets 70% of the return for taking at least one-third of 
the risk. 
Other government programs and initiatives 
This paper simply does not have scope to comprehensively list – let alone analyse 
– the vast legion of state and federal government programs that directly or indirectly 
impact the venture capital industry.  The most important reference is the Department of 
Industry Science and Resources publication entitled, Commonwealth and State 
Government Programs Supporting Innovation in Firms (DISR 1999).  However, 
particular mention should be made of the Howard Government’s Plan for Australian 
Industry (Commonwealth of Australia 1997) which recognised the key role played by the 
Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR).  DISR is the most important 
government agency directly impacting the venture capital industry.  It has a broad 
portfolio of responsibilities with the following general aims.  
 Improving national prosperity and wellbeing. 
 Improving the competitiveness  of Australian business. 
 Fostering excellence in Australian science, technology and sport. 
 Maximising the national benefits of research and innovation.  
 Increasing productivity investment in Australia. 
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These aims are intended to foster economic advantages and scientific achievements 
that continue to strengthen Australia’s international competitiveness.  Also, DISR is 
aiming to strengthen Australia’s national system of science and innovation. 
These overarching aims are promulgated through a large number of 
instrumentalities and programs. These include: 
 AusIndustry; 
 Australian Government Analytical Laboratories (AGAL); 
 Australian Surveying and Land Information Group (AUSLIG); 
 Ionospheric Prediction Service (IPS); 
 IP Australia; 
 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). 
The industry association: AVCAL 
AVCAL, the Australian Venture Capital Association Limited (website 
www.avcal.com.au) is the peak industry body of the Australian venture capital industry.  
Membership of the association comprises venture capital firms (over 100 corporate 
members at time of writing), banks, incubators, angels, corporate advisers, Information 
Technology and Telecommunication (IT&T) companies, accountants, lawyers, 
government bodies, academic institutions and other service providers to the industry.  
AVCAL was established in 1992 as a forum for the industry participants to meet, to 
pursue topics of common interest, to promote the local venture capital industry and to 
encourage investment in growing business enterprises.  In October 1995, AVCAL 
appointed its first Executive Director to raise the profile of the venture capital sector with 
Governments and industry, and to build a strong industry association.  This role has been 
continued with the appointment of Andrew Green as the second Executive Director in 
1999.   
AVCAL’s mission is to create a world-best environment in Australia for venture 
capital and entrepreneurship.  Creating an awareness of the returns institutions can 
receive by investment in venture capital funds, and encouraging them to include a venture 
capital weighting in their portfolio at levels similar to that in comparable markets.  A list 
of significant activities includes: information collection and dissemination; publication 
and conferences; lobbying; and standard setting. 
Media  
Venture capital is now regularly discussed and criticised in the general business 
press, particularly the Australian Financial Review.  Victor Bivell, the owner of 
Pollitecon Publications, is the editor and publisher of the industry’s trade magazine, 
Australian Venture Capital Journal.  This is published monthly.  Every year the same 
organisation produces the Australian Venture Capital Guide (now in its eighth edition).  
The guide attempts to list all sources of private equity and related financing for growth 
companies. 
An increasingly important channel of information distribution is Venturelink 
(www.venturelink.net).  It was commenced as a labour of love by graduates of the Master 
of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (MEI) program at Swinburne University of 
Technology’s Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship.  The network has 
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expanded rapidly beyond its original alumni focus, attracting growing membership and 
sponsorship.  Venturelink has a broad, inclusive mission to become the ‘first portal of 
call’1 for all matters pertaining to Australian entrepreneurship.  It provides information 
and links to a wide variety of sources and sites germane to Australian venture capital. 
Industry measurement and research 
Very recently, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (see above) has 
undertaken a survey of venture capital at the request of the Department of Industry, 
Science and Resources.  The request was prompted by changes in tax regimes for venture 
capital investment announced as part of the 1999 budget.  There had been considerable 
concern that existing venture capital data (mostly ad hoc surveys using convenience 
samples) suffered from lack of clarity in the concepts and constructs employed and from 
inadequate response rates.  ABS conducted its inaugural survey with respect of the year 
ended June 2000.  This followed a feasibility study, during which a number of venture 
capital practitioners, industry researchers, academics, and policy analysts were consulted.  
The survey concepts and questionnaire were developed by ABS in consultation with 
users, industry bodies and data providers.  Considerable assistance to the ABS was 
provided by the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts.  
If the survey can become established on a regular basis it will form a solid base for the 
commencement of sophisticated venture capital research  in Australia.  
This first survey presented a significant challenge to both ABS and data providers.  
Concepts employed were synthesised from terms used in the industry.  Frequently the 
same form of words has different nuances.  Many differences make it hard to standardise 
an approach.  For instance, accounting treatments, valuation practises, methods of 
operation can vary from firm to firm.  There are some differences between industry and 
the criteria used to evaluate projects applying for government assistance.  ABS 
discovered what the industry has long known: the term ‘venture capital’ and associated 
data concepts have a range of meanings for a range of audiences.  In its survey, ABS gave 
self-description precedence over administratively based definitions.  So, there may be 
inconsistencies in the dataset as a result.  However, detailed analysis of the dataset can 
provide a view appropriate for policy purposes.  And the interest and intended 
commitment to regular surveying by ABS definitely represents a coming of age in the 
industry.  It is possible that the annual AVCAL survey of its members and the surveys 
commissioned by the Australian Venture Capital Journal could become structured 
subsets of an annual comprehensive survey of the industry by the ABS. 
University interest in venture capital is developing strongly but is largely 
unsupported by any corporate interest.  The University of South Australia is committed to 
a program which aims eventually to ensure that every student in whatever program does 
at least one course in entrepreneurship.  RMIT University started an undergraduate 
entrepreneurship degree in 2001.  For several years, Queensland University of 
Technology has been the heart and soul of promoting Moot Corp’s Business Planning 
Competition.  In the year 2000, this international competition was won by an Australian 
team from Bond University and the Australian Team from Swinburne came third – a truly 
remarkable performance.  The biggest research program in entrepreneurship is housed at 
                                                          
1 A phrase first coined by Venturelink founder Author B. 
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Melbourne’s Swinburne University of Technology, home of the Australian Graduate 
School of Entrepreneurship (AGSE).  AGSE has a 15-year history of developing 
specialist programs in entrepreneurship education and research.  Originally, the focus was 
centered upon the Master of Entrepreneurship and Innovation degree (an alternative to the 
MBA).  Now, there is equal emphasis on developing a world-class research program 
hoping to include a strong strand of venture capital research.  Its biggest single project, 
sponsored by Yellow Pages, is the Australian component of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project.  This annual monitor of the entrepreneurial 
propensities and performance of participating nations has grown rapidly.  Ten countries 
took part in 1999; 21 (including Australia – see Hindle and Rushworth 2000) in 2000; 29 
are participating in 2001.  Using identical methodology each country produces an annual 
national report and a global executive report summarises the international lessons.  
Importantly, the 2000 GEM Executive Report (Reynolds et al 2000) included an 
international comparison of the venture capital industries of 19 participating countries.  
This comparison will be continued in future years. 
Critique: what has history taught us? 
Overview 
It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed critique of every 
stakeholder and initiative comprising the past evolution and present framework of the 
Australian VC industry.  The authors have selected the following ‘mighty handful’ as the 
most important areas for critical commentary. 
 
• Retail venture capital funds. 
• Government initiatives in general. 
• Specific lessons from the MIC program. 
• Comparison of the Australian with international VC industries. 
• The low volume of systematic research and analysis. 
Retail VC funds 
As the person who raised the first listed venture capital fund in Australia, BT 
Innovation Limited with 1600 shareholders, one of the authors, has formed a strong 
personal view that retail VC funds should be avoided at all costs. 
As noted above, an institutional fund makes calls on its investors for both quarterly 
management fees and investments.  Typically a 10-year fund with say 15 investments 
will make some 60 calls over the life of the fund.  This is done to maximise the IRR.  
However for a retail investor this process would be a nightmare.  Typically subscriptions 
are done in one or two calls.  So, while the prospectus of a retail fund will quote the IRRs 
made by institutional funds, a one-call structure alone means the IRR will be much lower. 
Retail investors need liquidity; institutions have the time and incoming cash flow 
to participate in 10-year liquidating funds.  Listed funds, however, generally trade at 
significant discounts to their Net Tangible Asset (NTA) per share valuations, VC funds 
particularly do so.  Lion Selection Group, a PDF that specialises in the mining industry 
and is very well run with experienced managers was recently trading at a 25% discount to 
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its stated net tangible asset backing of $1.13 per share.  This is because the NTA of the 
fund comprise shares in companies with substantial intangibles/blue sky and limited 
liquidity. 
Finally, in venture capital the lemons fall before the plums.  Unsuccessful 
investments go under while successful ones grow in value and are kept in the portfolio.  
Hence with semi-annual reporting and continuous disclosure a listed VC fund for first 
three or four years is reporting losses.  This again drives the share price down.  The only 
argument for listed VC funds is that for new structures they are generally the only way to 
go.  In the USA the first Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) were listed and 
in Australia the first MICs and PDFs were listed.  Some retail investors have an appetite 
for risk much greater than the institutions.  Unfortunately, they are often speculators with 
short time horizons.  The returns to share holders in retail VC funds have been mixed at 
best. 
Government initiatives in general 
The most efficient venture capital decisions for the economy will be made by 
investors risking capital to back entrepreneurs in whom they believe, in a market they 
think will be substantial and with a reward that is commensurate with the risk, compared 
to other opportunities.  The authors are in fundamental agreement with Thomas Jefferson 
who said the best role of government in commerce is to set up some minimal rules of the 
game and let the private players play.  However, setting up rules of the game is a complex 
activity and demands constructive dialogue between the public and private sectors, not a 
lazy form of laissez faire.  
A major mistake a government can take is to distort the taxation system with quick 
fix benefits rather than adapting it to the real life-cycles of genuine entrepreneurial firms.  
Up-front deduction schemes can be particularly distorting and only marginally helpful to 
the right firms at the right stage of growth.  It is really amazing how fast the Australian 
merchant banking community can make use of a tax loophole and the funds they can pass 
through it.  One of the best/worst examples was the highly complex  150% Research and 
Development Tax Deduction/Syndication scheme.  This started in 1989 and by 1993 had 
grown to a three billion dollar industry.  One of the authors participated in syndicate 
number three of the scheme, in 1989.  This was only for $20 million.  The whole 
structure made scheme promoters a great deal of money and delivered totally risk free tax 
deductions to the banks but helped the R&D effort of growing firms very little.  Given the 
projects such as this, the Howard government’s decision first to abolish the more 
outlandish schemes and secondly reduce the R&D tax deduction to 125% was 
understandable.  Many have argued that the R&D deduction should be reduced to 100% 
because the deduction is really only of help to multi-nationals who spend most of the time 
trying to persuade government bureaucrats that a non-R&D expenditure is one so as to 
gain the tax shelter.  Most early-stage, growing companies make only marginal profits at 
best.  So a tax deduction of this nature (as distinct from a proper appreciation of the 
incentive role of well-structured income and capital gains tax regimes) is of little benefit 
to true entrepreneurs. 
The second mistake made by governments has been to invest directly in young 
companies.  Such direct involvement in investments by government substitutes the 
wisdom of a few for the collective wisdom of the many in the market.  Moreover, direct 
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government investment not only competes with and discourages private venture capital, 
but the decision-making processes of agencies of any government are inevitably laden 
with considerations concerned more with stopping bad publicity rather than maximising 
the chances the company will succeed in its chosen market.   
Of course market failure is the cri-de-coeur of the socialist and hence they 
generally create the biggest investment failures.  A good example of this phenomenon 
was the Victorian Economic Development Corporation (VEDC).  In the mid-1980s this 
state owned corporation achieved the goal of making Victoria a no-go area for venture 
capitalists.  One of the authors remembers three prospective investee companies in 
Victoria all of whom turned down his offer of $2 million equity and instead took an 
unsecured loan from the VEDC.  What happened was tragedy when VEDC was put into 
receivership several years later.  The receiver then started calling in the loans.  All these 
companies were growing (even in the midst of the recession) and were capital 
constrained.  Now they needed $4 – $5 million, $2 million to pay back the VEDC and $2 
– $3 million for growth.  The capital was unavailable and all three companies went into 
liquidation.  The best history of failure and warning against its re-creation is contained in 
a contemporary document.  Fergus Ryan wrote an excellent report on the VEDC (Ryan 
1999: passim). 
With respect to other government initiatives, Hindle and Mitchell (2001) have 
provided a critique of five entrepreneurship-fostering programs within the AusIndustry 
portfolio.  Their main critique is that bureaucratic policy makers are well-motivated but 
lack the diversity of perspective needed to provide appropriate policy initiatives for the 
industry.  They summarise the contribution of the programs they studied to venture 
capital and entrepreneurship as follows. 
‘We would propose that Australian Federal agencies look at policy formulation in 
this area through a new set of lenses.  The first change should be a recognition of the 
difference between entrepreneurship and innovation.  While policy documents are full of 
references to innovation, the actual implementation ends up being focussed on technology 
push.  We would propose that new programs be developed that recognise that there are 
multiple frameworks for looking at the process of new venture development..’  (Hindle 
and Mitchell 2001: 14). 
Specific lessons from the MIC program: a classic case of agency capture 
The MIC program remains Australia’s best historical classroom when it comes to 
learning lessons about most aspects of developing a national venture capital industry.  
There were many weaknesses in the MIC program.  Bill Ferris (Ferris 2000: 100) 
has captured the essence of most of them: sheer restriction of possibility. 
‘ …with the benefit of hindsight, the architecture of the MIC scheme was 
fundamentally flawed….the restrictions on how the money could be invested virtually 
guaranteed future failure.  Only investments in early-stage technology companies were 
permitted; since a maximum investment for most MIC funds was only about $1 million in 
any one investee, most of the MICs developed extremely high risk portfolios with no 
capacity for follow-on support investing’.  
Two key lessons remain to be articulated.  First is that the MIC program offered its 
strongest appeal to retail investors because its prime benefit was a 100% tax deduction on 
capital subscribed.  This was a major flaw because retail investors are, on the whole, the 
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wrong type for venture capital involvement.  However, the second problem, not stated in 
most analyses of the MIC program is a greater evil.  The MIC program suffered from the 
classic problem known as ‘agency capture’.  
One of the authors worked as consultant on a team engaged in applying for an MIC 
licence.  The fundamental reason for the applicants’ interest in obtaining the licence was 
the feeling that it would be joining an ‘exclusive club’ which could potentially dominate 
an asset category.  Subsequently, as an advisor to two MIC Licencees he saw many 
manifestations of the negative aspects of this exclusivity syndrome.  The other author of 
this paper experienced the same undesirable sentiment even more poignantly.  In May 
1984 he worked at BT Innovations, one of the seven successful applicants for the MIC 
Licence.  He was charged with raising the money and adopted a strategy totally aimed at 
the high income-earning individual taxed at the then 60% marginal tax rate.  On June 30, 
1984, BT Innovation was the first and only MIC that had fully raised its $10 million 
funding.  Its structure of a listed retail fund became the norm for the rest of the MICs who 
all then went that route.  In late July the first meeting of the newly appointed MIC 
managers was held with the MIC Licensing Board.  Prior to the meeting, the MIC 
managers got together for lunch.  Within five minutes the discussion shifted to how could 
the incumbent MICs prevent any more licences being handed out.  The scenario was 
straight out of Adam Smith. 
‘People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices’.  (Smith 1952/1776). 
The author disagreed and said MIC firms should take the opposite tack.  He 
contended that they should lobby to have as many licences handed out as possible in 
order to replace those managers that would fail.  He then made the prediction that over 
half of the managers sitting around the luncheon table would not be around in five years.  
(In passing, the author confesses his pride in his belief that this was one of the few five-
year forecasts made by a formally trained economist that has ever actually come true).  
The result was that he was given the cold shoulder and never invited to lunch again.  
Unfortunately, the incumbent MICs did manage to restrict the issue new MIC 
licences to three. No new MICs entered the market after the second year.  The 
performance of many of the MIC managers was in line with industry norms and the 
reputation of the whole program suffered.  The lack of dynamic domestic rivalry in an 
industry generally leads to insularity and failure. And so it was with the MIC program. 
Comparison with international VC industries 
Writing in a special appendix to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000 
Executive Report (Reynolds et al 2000: 48), Bill Bygrave argued: 
 ‘By almost any measure, 1999 was the most spectacular year ever for the 
professional venture capital industry.  In the US, $46 billion was invested, a 150% 
increase over 1998 investments and more than 8 times the amount invested in 1995.  In 
Europe, approximately $10.8 billion was invested, an 84% increase over 1998 and more 
than five times the amount invested in 1995.  And 1999 was a very good year for venture 
capital investments in Asia, Australia, and Canada.  Through the first half of 2000, 
venture capital investments continued to set new records in the USA and Europe.  The 
 19
amount invested in the USA more than doubled over the same period in 1999, while 
Germany’s investments were up more than 78 %. 
To facilitate comparisons among GEM nations, the amount of venture capital 
invested domestically was calculated as a proportion of GDP for each country.  Chart 2 of 
this paper reproduces figure 19 of the Global GEM study (Reynolds et al 2000: 49).  
 
Chart 2.
Ratio of venture capital invested domestically to GDP
 in 1999
JAPAN
ITALY
DENMARK
NORWAY
AUSTRALIA
SPAIN
IRELAND
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
SWEDEN
INDIA
UK
BELGIUM
SINGAPORE
KOREA
CANADA
ISRAEL
USA
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
 
 Chart 2 is a reproduction of GEM 2000’s Figure 19.   
 (Source Reynolds et al 2000: 49) 
 
 
On ratio of venture capital invested domestically as a percentage of GDP, Australia 
ranked fifth last among the 19 countries measured.  The value of US domestic venture 
capital investments represents well over 5% of national GDP.  In Australia, the figure is 
well less than 1% of GDP.  Australia ranked even worse – third last among the 19 
measured nations – on its ‘ratio of venture capital invested domestically in all stages of 
information technology companies to GDP’.  This is depicted in chart 3, which 
reproduces figure 21 of the Global GEM study (Reynolds et al 2000: 50).   
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Chart 3.
Ratio of venture capital invested domestically in all stages of 
information technology companies to GDP
 in 1999
DENMARK
AUSTRALIA
ITALY
SPAIN
GERMANY
INDIA
FINLAND
FRANCE
SWEDEN
IRELAND
NORWAY
BELGIUM
SINGAPORE
UK
CANADA
ISRAEL
USA
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
 
 Chart 3 is a reproduction of GEM 2000’s Figure 20. 
 (Source: Reynolds et al 2000: 50) 
 
 
These graphs of international relativity really help to put the Australian venture 
capital industry into perspective.  The industry may well congratulate itself for coming 
back from the near dead in the early 1990s.  However, when VC is placed in the 
perspective of the total economy, it is clear that the industry is far less significant in this 
country than it is in many other nations.  For instance, India, a later starter in the game 
and a country with vast socio-economic problems, has a far better developed venture 
capital industry than Australia.  The Australian VC industry is far less significant than it 
should be if any of our multitudinous rhetoric about being an ‘enterprising nation’ or a 
‘clever country’ and the like is ever to bear any relation to measured reality.  The 
Australian Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000 report (Hindle and Rushworth 2000: 
passim) demonstrated that we are great starters of new ventures (fourth among 
participating countries on this metric).  But we are bad at creating and sustaining the kind 
of ventures – high-growth, high-technology, high-employment – that the country needs 
the most.  This is the most important socio-economic role of a venture capital industry: 
facilitation of genuine entrepreneurship resulting in high-employing, world-competitive 
ventures.  Measured by this standard, the industry is very immature.  Tiny Israel, amid all 
its domestic and international problems, has managed to create a world class venture 
capital industry in a very short span of years.  After the USA, Israel produces the highest 
number of annual NASDAQ listings of any company. True, Israel has three possibly 
unique drivers of venture capital success: the world’s highest proportion of engineers in 
the population; a defence establishment that knows how to collaborate with industry; and 
very strong links to the New York finance community.  
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In contrast to Israel, Australia is still prone to employ the comfortable excuses that 
we are a small country and it is still early days. Well, it is late days and we are under-
performing on a world scale (which is the only relevant scale) in applied entrepreneurship 
and venture capital.  The evidence is inescapable.  
The low volume of systematic research and analysis 
One reason for this is the low priority accorded to venture capital and 
entrepreneurship research in this nation.  An explanation often offered for the recent 
collapse in the Australian dollar is that Australia is an old economy compared to the new 
Internet driven economy of the USA.  Such an explanation is symptomatic of the national 
lack of understanding of the importance of entrepreneurship.  It is not the Internet that is 
the differentiator between the USA and Australia but the embrace of entrepreneurship and 
venture capital.  For example in 1999, 90% of the MBA graduate cohort of Stanford 
University left to join start-ups; at the London Business School it was one-third, while 
only one graduate of the New South Wales University’s Australian Graduate School of 
Management (AGSM) followed the entrepreneurial way in 1999.  The study of 
entrepreneurship and venture capital has become a major academic activity overseas with 
a number of centres being set up over the past 15 years in Europe and the USA. By 
contrast the topic has had very low profile in Australia.  For another example the 1998 
Reserve Bank of Australia conference proceedings Unemployment and the Australian 
Labour Market was 366 pages long, but only had three paragraphs on role of 
entrepreneurs and venture capital in creating employment. 
The knowledge, skills and understanding that build from Australia’s emerging 
university initiatives (discussed in a previous section) is very important for the 
development of the venture capital industry.  For example, over 10 graduates of the 
Swinburne MEI program now work as investment managers.  However, with one 
outstanding exception – the substantial support of Yellow Pages for the Australian 
component of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor – industry support for 
entrepreneurship research in general and venture capital research in particular is still 
conspicuous by its absence in this nation.  Empirical and theoretical investigation of 
important issues currently has only two strands: the GEM venture capital subset study 
and sporadic, disconnected, unsupported studies of concerned university researchers.  
There is no structured program.  Swinburne University, through the Australian Graduate 
School of Entrepreneurship (AGSE), is trying to build a program but there has, to date, 
been little private sector interest.  Is there one venture capital company that has ever 
given one dollar for Entrepreneurship research in Australia?  No.  Compare that with the 
vigorous tradition of scholarship support for research in the USA and in Europe.  
One program that is supposed to address this issue largely fails in its avowed 
mission to commercialize intellectual property. While it may or may not be good at 
generating new knowledge, the Cooperative Research Centre Program (CRC) has been 
very ineffective in fostering entrepreneurship (see Hindle and Mitchell 2001). The 
exception which proves the rule is the Photonics CRC which has spun out one world-
class business. However, the program which is well-intentioned and attracts large 
volumes of government funding is trapped by its own ‘hard science/basic research’ frame 
of reference. Social science is excluded from consideration. A recent attempt by a cohort 
of universities and private organizations to establish an innovation CRC – with the 
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avowed mission of helping all the other CRCs to commercialise their intellectual property 
– failed to get to first base in the evaluation process. Unfortunately, CRCs which should 
include entrepreneurship research in their agendas, are another example of agency 
capture: the basic research establishment dominates. Commercialisation and 
entrepreneurship  are low priorities.  
At the industry level, the scant regard for entrepreneurship research mirrors that of 
society at large. Serious academic and industrial venture capital research in Australia 
sadly lags overseas efforts.  To date, the industry has not perceived the importance of the 
gap.  It has rested content with very basic (and incomplete) descriptive surveys: ‘who 
spent what in which sector’.  There has been no support for empirical investigation of key 
processes and issues; no testing of important hypotheses; no private or public financial 
support for systematic study of any aspect of the industry – even in such basic areas as 
comparative portfolio evaluation.  
In the USA and Europe, venture capital research is a substantial field of academic 
research and the knowledge produced by that research is regarded as an integral 
component of the industry.  In Australia, venture capital research is in its infancy and the 
infant is severely undernourished. 
Future directions: better entrepreneurship through improved provision of 
venture capital 
Recommendation limits 
The great temptation at the end of a paper of this nature is to spray forth a legion of 
unconnected recommendations.  Venture capital is an exciting and important field and it 
is not hard to conceive of hundreds of suggestions that might prove beneficial to the 
industry and the nation.  The authors prefer to err in the other direction and limit their 
recommendations to just two, one academic and one industrial: 
 
• the need to commission a large-scale analytical history of the VC industry; 
• the need to continue to build a constructive consensus between public and private 
sector policy makers. 
Recommendation 1: commissioning of an analytical history of the Australian VC 
industry 
General calls for greater research support are usually too vague to have any impact.  
What is most needed by Australian venture capital scholarship and practise is a seminal 
work.  The field needs a palpable demonstration of the high value of research and critique 
to industrial development.  The authors recommend that industry members commission 
an analytical history of the venture capital industry in Australia.  The work envisaged 
would embrace the following areas. 
 
 It would ensure a systematic collection, archiving and review of major primary 
source documents – some now in danger of being lost forever. 
 It would demand close liaison with the Australian Bureau of Statistics with respect 
to establishing the parameters of a national VC database. 
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 It would tell a great story – the detailed narrative of industry evolution – to a wide 
range of audiences now ignorant of one of the most important social phenomena in 
national life. 
 It should embrace several forms of economic and social evaluation of the industry 
– especially comparative portfolio analysis and impact studies of the value of VC-
backed firms to the nation. 
 It should embrace numerous relevant sub-studies including quantitative and 
qualitative research projects on key topics such as: analysis of investment decision-
making techniques; forms of organisation of both VC companies and the funds 
they manage, education and development of industry professionals. 
 It should articulate an appropriate agenda of applied research aimed at answering 
the questions of most importance to the industry’s future. 
 It would form the evidential basis for informed policy debate. 
 
A well-written, critical history going well beyond mere narrative into the realms of 
explanation and direction setting would have many tangible benefits.  It would invigorate 
the intellectual rigor of the industry, inform the policy debate and help to unify private 
sector, public sector and academic understanding of the importance of venture capital to 
national destiny in the 21st century.  Best of all, it would be a very affordable project.  A 
small levy on a few firms or a generous donation from one would be likely to be backed 
by government funds in the form of a SPIRT grant or similar.  A small, affordable 
initiative could have a substantial effect. 
Recommendation 2: continuing a consensus for constructive, sustained government 
involvement 
There are some accelerators that governments can provide for venture capital 
without being so intrusive as to spoil the game.  One is to jump-start the flow of venture 
capital by lending money to or becoming limited shareholders in entrepreneurial venture 
capital firms that meet certain qualifications, including raising private money, but to let 
capital-risking private managers make the decisions as to where to invest the time and 
money.  This was done, more or less successfully, in the USA in 1958 with the SBIC 
program and helped start venture capital as an eventually privately financed asset class.  
The Federal Government has followed this path with the IIF program and all the 
indications are that this, of all the Australian VC programs, is the structure that will meet 
with the best success.  Already the Federal Government has followed up the first five 
licences with a second round.  Also two specialist funds – one for renewable energy and 
the other for biotechnology – are underway. 
In any discussion of venture capital, it is important to remember that the enabling 
of entrepreneurs is the primary goal.  There are several social and economic conditions 
other than available venture capital that must be present for entrepreneurs to thrive, so 
that promoting venture capital without helping to create those other conditions not 
already present will fail to produce significant results.  Of these the most critical is the 
rate of capital gains tax for both entrepreneurs and investors.  Besides moderate to low 
tax rates, other factors required to promote entrepreneurship are: 
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 an emphasis on equity as a means of financing; 
 an effective stock market for smaller companies; 
 a pool of talent and knowledge in science, technology and business; 
 the availability of large markets; 
 a minimum of regulatory activity by governments, and 
 a public appreciation of the importance of entrepreneurs in the society. 
 
The first four are either in place or have been introduced by the Federal 
Government.  The Internet and the 747 between them are eliminating the tyranny of 
distance.  The reduction of regulatory activity will depend on the State governments.  It is 
to be hoped that the natural competitive drive of State Governments to make their state 
more industry-attractive will not prevent the creation of beneficial, uniform initiatives.  
Greater public appreciation of the importance of true entrepreneurs in Australian society 
will take time, because it is a cultural issue.  The keys will be education – getting 
entrepreneurship onto school curricula – and an improvement in media commitment to 
the positive aspects of socially-beneficial entrepreneurship.  
The final sections of the GEM Australia 2000 report (Hindle and Rushworth 2000: 
42–46) articulated some sensible policy directions.  What they boil down to is the same 
argument made in this paper.  The essential ingredient to national progress in venture 
capital and entrepreneurship is simply open-minded intelligence.  We live in a mixed 
economy. Ignorant, laissez-faire braying about minimising government interference is as 
unhelpful as socialist belief that government should be a direct investor and portfolio 
manager.  What is required is a consensus for informed mutual participation in the 
national interest.  We conclude this paper with a demonstration that, in Australia, this is 
possible, not only at the level of industry to government but at the level of individual to 
government. 
Healthy prognosis: a case study of constructive involvement 
In November 23, 1998 the first Ralph Report, A Strong Foundation, was released.  
It was almost totally directed at an audience of large corporations. In absolute frustration 
one of the authors of this paper, decided to act.  Author A went along to his local MP, 
Tony Abbot, in January 1999, mapped out the problem and asked for help.  Tony Abbot, 
sitting in his surgery on Manly beach, handling a mixed queue of surfers and eclectic 
humanity was incredibly helpful.  After Author A explained the problem, Abbot laid out 
a three-point plan. 
First he said, Author A had to get an article in the Financial Review.  Abbot said 
that Senator Alston (Minister for Communications) had just written an article arguing for 
tax breaks for the IT industry.  Abbot suggested Author A write one in reply.  This was 
achieved and published.  The second step was that, armed with this article, Tony Abbot 
had the leverage to get Author A in front of a chief ministerial adviser.  Abbot’s comment 
was straight out of Yes Minister. 
‘Don’t bother lobbying ministers’, he said, ‘they will never remember you.  You 
must get to a chief adviser’.  
Anyway, Abbot secured Author A a meeting with David Hickman, who was the 
chief adviser to Minister Peter Reith, an influential senior minister whose department 
would have significant input in drafting the legislative changes flowing from the Ralph 
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report.  Abbot then revealed the third ingredient.  Author A needed to present a 20–page 
brief arguing his case at that meeting.  Abbot suggested that a hired think-tank should 
prepare the brief.  Not having the resources for such an expensive exercise in professional 
lobbying, Author A decided that he had had enough training in economics to do it himself 
– with a little help from his friends.   
Over six weekends, as they played their usual game at the local golf club, Author A 
bounced more than a little white ball along the fairways.  His playing partner was a 
professional taxation expert.  Author A bounced his developing arguments off his friend.  
Author A finally handed the report to ministerial advisor Hickman in April 1999.  
Hickman started skimming it and then after a 10-minute read said it was very good and 
promised to make sure it was circulated in the right places.  In June 1999 Author A was 
then invited to participate in a conference organised by Senator Alston’s office with 
important Treasury officials.  It lasted three hours: two of which were consumed with 
Author A arguing with the three Treasury representatives.  They finally asked if Author A 
would give up averaging and indexation for major cut in the Capital Gains Tax rate.  
Author A said:  
‘Yes I will.  And you know it will be the right decision, as the accountants will 
immediately start complaining’.   
So it came about that a major impediment to the expansion of the VC industry, the 
old punitive capital gains tax regime, was to be overhauled.  Of course, as the ancient 
Greeks knew, victory has many generals while defeat is an orphan.  Dr Paul Twomey, the 
recent CEO of the National Office for the Information Economy, was a vital actor.  
Twomey was instrumental in shepherding through the change.  Twomey’s reports (that he 
kindly asked Author A to vet) were vital to the passage of the ultimate legislation.  The 
rest, as the saying goes is history: significant history for the Australian venture capital 
industry, Australian entrepreneurship and the nation at large.  
Thus, this paper ends on a very positive note concerning the future development of 
the Australian venture capital industry.  There is something very good about a country 
and a political system that allows grass roots individuals the ability to argue and push 
through major structural economic reform.  In particular, this success indicates the 
practical importance that a future program of structured research might have for the 
productive development of venture capital and entrepreneurship in Australia.  In this case, 
knowledge truly was power. 
The authors contend that, if the lessons of history are heeded, Australia has the 
capacity to form a consensus for developing a VC industry that is both fiercely 
competitive and in the national interest.  To do so is not a paradox.  It is a necessity.  
However, we cannot read the lessons of a largely unwritten history, build good programs 
on bad data or base superior practise on inferior theory.  We need a structured program of 
multi-disciplinary venture capital research, starting with the commissioning of a detailed 
analytical history of the industry.  This work can then become just one of the texts in an 
even more important program: a national commitment to entrepreneurship education that 
goes beyond business schools to education at every level.  Research and education are the 
major priorities and essential predicates of a constructive future for the Australian venture 
capital industry and the entrepreneurs it exists to serve. 
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